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POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
BE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE, IN LIGHT OF ITS 
INVESTIGATORY PURPOSE 
Appellee ("Brixen") argues the investigator affidavit was "the State's sole 
evidence before the court" Br. Aple. at 3 (emphasis in original), the State failed to prove 
Brixen's participation in a conspiracy, and the investigator information was inadequate. 
See Br. Aple. at 1-3, 13-15. In doing so, Brixen ignores evidence before the trial court 
and advocates adoption of such a high standard that no antitrust investigation could 
proceed. 
A. The trial court record included more than just the investigator 
affidavit. 
In several locations in its brief, Brixen incorrectly asserts that the information the 
State presented to the trial court consisted only of the investigator affidavit. See Br. Aple. 
at 1 (material presented to the district court was the investigator affidavit); 3 (affidavit 
was the State's sole evidence); 4 (affidavit was the only evidence presented by the State). 
While the State believes an investigator affidavit can be sufficient evidence to 
support a CID, see American Pharmaceutical Ass 'n v. United States, 467 F.2d 1290, 1291 
(6th Cir. 1972), the court below had before it additional evidence. The trial court record 
also includes the form contract used by the Utah Division of Facilities Construction and 
Management (DFCM) when hiring architects (R. 44-59) and the testimony proffered to 
the court at the March 16 hearing (R. 84:1-45, Addendum D to Appellant's brief). Both 
the DFCM contract and the testimony proffered at the hearing are part of the trial record 
and were available to the court in evaluating the State's reasonable cause. 
The DFCM contract, which prohibits architects from using consultants affiliated 
with vendors and requires all consultants to be approved by DFCM, is designed to reduce 
the influence of vendors in the bid-preparation process. This reinforces the investigator's 
statement that manufacturers offer free specification writing services to architects (R. 34) 
and corroborates the Attorney General's concern over improper bidding restraints. 
The court also held an extensive discussion with the State's counsel regarding the 
extent of its investigation leading up to the CID. This on-the-record exchange resulted in 
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the disclosure of additional details not contained in the investigator affidavit. Because the 
court had declined the State's invitation to put the investigator on the witness stand (R. 
84:21), the State was left to proffer testimony that would have been provided by the 
investigator. That proffered testimony added to, and corroborated, the statements in the 
investigator affidavit.1 
The reasonable cause evaluation in Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998), was 
based only on an investigator affidavit and a copy of articles of incorporation for one of 
the entities. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the affidavit and the articles of 
incorporation provided "specific evidence" sufficient to enforce the CID. Id. at 183. 
B. At this preliminary stage of an investigation, the State's level of proof is 
lower than at trial. 
Brixen cites a number of private antitrust cases in support of its recitation of what 
"[a]n antitrust plaintiff must prove[.]" Br. Aple. at 4-6. While Brixen's list of elements to 
be proven at trial may be correct, it simply is premature. Brixen would require the State 
to prove all the elements of a violation and meet the standards of proof applicable at a 
1
 In a proceeding, such as this, in which the trial court is not convinced that the 
investigator's affidavit and the DFCM contract demonstrated reasonable cause, the court 
should have accepted additional evidence from the investigator at the hearing. This 
procedure would have enabled the court to determine whether sufficient reasonable cause 
exists that might not have been included in the affidavit already submitted. 
When Judge Lewis declined to accept additional information from the investigator, 
the State was left to proffer the type of information the investigator could have provided. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2). On appeal, this court should consider the proffered evidence in 
evaluating the State's reasonable cause. See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^ [17, 999 P.2d 7, 
13; State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989). 
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trial on the merits, rather than the lower standards applicable to a pre-complaint 
investigatory demand.2 Admittedly, if the higher standards were required at this 
preliminary stage, the State's evidence presented to the trial court would fail. Brixen's 
approach would deny the State the ability to prove antitrust violations through the simple 
process of preventing the State from even being able to investigate suspected violations. 
Such is not the law applicable to antitrust investigative demands. 
The Evans court explained the context to be used in evaluating CIDs: "[T]he CIDs 
issued by the Utah Attorney General assist that agency in gathering enough information to 
make a proper determination as to whether a civil antitrust action should be initiated." 
Evans, 963P.2dat 181. 
Not only is the "reasonable cause" standard applicable to CIDs lower than that 
required for trial, it is lower than the "probable cause" standard. 
Reason dictates that an investigation based on the reasonable cause standard 
requires less evidence than the "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact" required by the probable cause 
standard. Moreover, the reasonable cause standard would seem to allow an 
investigation to go forward on the assumption that the attorney general's 
case will only get stronger as the investigation proceeds. 
M a t l 8 2 . 3 
2
 Each type of antitrust violation (boycott, price fixing, bid rigging, market 
allocation, etc.) has unique elements of proof. This further illustrates Ihe impossible 
standard proposed by Brixen. It would be difficult for the State to prove the elements of a 
particular violation when it has not yet decided what violations have occurred, if any. 
3
 When evaluating reasonable cause, the trial court does not act in a fact finding 
role, but assumes the accuracy of evidence presented. Id. The question is this: Assuming 
4 
C. The existence of an agreement can be implied from conduct. 
Brixen next argues that the State has not demonstrated the existence of an 
"agreement" or proven that Brixen participated in a "conspiracy." See Br. Aple. at 2-5. 
Brixen misstates the law applicable to this stage of the investigation. As the State 
discussed in its initial brief, the law does not require the State to prove that Brixen 
engaged in a conspiracy. The test should be whether any conspiracy is being investigated. 
In this case, the State is investigating artificial bidding restraints created by a 
manufacturer - and is trying to determine whether Brixen participated in that bid-
distortion process. 
Moreover, Brixen overstates what type of conduct is necessary to constitute an 
"agreement." Participation in a conspiracy does not require that the parties formally agree 
to violate the law. "We recognize that it is only in rare cases that a plaintiff can establish 
the existence of a conspiracy by showing an explicit agreement; most conspiracies are 
inferred from the behavior of the alleged conspirators." Seagood Trading Corp. v. 
Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991). 
A course of dealing between seller and buyer may "ripen into an implied or 
informal agreement or understanding." McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto 
Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 1959). The existence of such an 
agreement or understanding, of course, must be evaluated in light of all the 
circumstances peculiar to the case at hand. 
the evidence is true, is it enough? Unfortunately, Judge Lewis's answer to this question 
was affected by her unwillingness to assume that the State's evidence was true. 
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Dillon Materials Handling, Inc. v. Albion Industries, 567 F.2d 1299, 1302 (5th Cir. 1978). 
The existence of a conspiracy also can be inferred from circumstantial economic evidence 
and market conditions. City qf Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 569 
(11th Cir. 1998). 
The goal of the Attorney General's investigation is to determine if a formal 
conspiracy, or even an "informal agreement" exists and, if so, the identity of the parties to 
the agreement. The State should not be required - at this preliminary stage - to prove the 
existence of explicit agreements with each participant in the bidding process before being 
able to seek relevant documents.4 
D. The State's evidence is to be considered as a whole. 
Much of Brixen's brief is devoted to taking selected portions of the investigator 
affidavit and discussing why each portion, taken alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a 
conspiracy or arguing that such conduct is not, itself, illegal. Br. Aple. at 5-12. For 
example, it argues (without citation to any authority): "Use of bid-drafting services does 
4
 For example, Brixen avers that the State failed to establish that architects 
submitted biased specifications "in exchange for free bid drafting services." Br. Aple. at 
6 (emphasis in original). It strains credulity to believe this manufacturer pays two 
employees to provide free bid drafting services without an expectation the manufacturer 
will sell more of its products as a result of this practice. The State should be entitled to 
such an inference. 
Viewed in very practical terms, an agreement does exist. If an architect meets with 
a manufacturer's specification writer to discuss the specifications needed for a particular 
bid, then uses specifications prepared by that manufacturer's representative, an agreement 
has been formed. If those specifications become the means of reducing competition 
improperly, the architect has become a party to an anticompetitive practice. 
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not violate any antitrust laws. It is merely a service, a form of salesmanship, and as such 
is procompetitive." Br. Aple. at 6. Similarly, Brixen contends that any violation of the 
DFCM contract must be pursued only in a breach of contract proceeding rather than as 
evidence of a larger anticompetitive scheme. Id. 
The strategy of attacking specific portions of the State's evidence as individually 
inadequate or inconclusive is the wrong way to evaluate the reasonableness of the State's 
inquiry. The State's evidence is to be considered as a whole. In Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1522 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 
(1985), the defendant had argued that each of the "six things" on which plaintiff relied to 
demonstrate exclusionary conduct had to be proven illegal. The court disagreed: 
"Plaintiffs evidence should be viewed as a whole. Each of the 'six things' viewed in 
isolation need not be supported by sufficient evidence to amount to a § 2 violation. It is 
enough that taken together they are sufficient to prove the monopolization claim." 
In Caldera's recent antitrust suit against Microsoft, Judge Benson noted: 
"Microsoft has attempted to separate what it believes are Caldera's individual claims by 
filing . . . nine motions for summary judgment. . . ." Caldera Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 
F.Supp.2d 1295, 1296 (D. Utah 1999). Microsoft had argued "that if specific 
anticompetitive conduct fails by itself to support a § 2 claim then such conduct may not 
be considered in determining whether a § 2 violation has occurred based on the totality of 
the circumstances." Id. at 1307. The court denied Microsoft's motions saying Caldera's 
7 
"entire case is based on the synergy of all of this conduct to demonstrate anticompetitive 
intent and effect." Id. at 1309. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted this approach in Evans: 
Plaintiffs argue that each one of these facts alone is not sufficient to meet 
the reasonable cause standard. However, reasonable cause is determined by 
combining all of the evidence and then determining whether, taken as a 
whole, there is reasonable cause to believe that the Utah Antitrust Act has 
been violated. 
Evans, 963 V2& at 184. 
The evidence submitted to the trial court is summarized in the State's initial brief 
and will not be repeated here. Br. Aplt. at 23-25. Examining the totality of the 
information furnished to the trial court, the State demonstrated possession of sufficient 
information to demonstrate reasonable cause to continue the investigation.5 
E. The State's evidence was sufficiently specific. 
Brixen also argues the investigator's affidavit lacks "sufficient factual specificity" 
to support reasonable cause. Br. Aple. at 16. This assertion mischaracterizes the legal 
standard applicable to a reasonable cause review and ignores the evidence before the trial 
court. 
5
 Brixen points out that the investigator affidavit described architect fees as being 
a percentage of total construction costs. Br. Aple. at 8-9. After the investigator affidavit 
was submitted, the State discovered that this practice occurs with private construction 
projects, but not in contracts for construction of state buildings. The State abandoned any 
further argument on this point. 
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Brixen complains that the basis for the State's investigation is "speculation" or 
"assumptions" and objects to the use of the words "appears" and "may." Id. at 3, 4, 9, 16. 
To require proof of the misconduct before being able to compel the production of 
information runs counter to the CID's purpose "in gathering enough information to make 
a proper determination as to whether a civil antitrust action should be initiated." Evans, 
963P.2datl81. 
The paradox of requiring the State to establish a basis for the investigation, even 
though the goal of the CID was to gather information for the investigation, was 
recognized by the Evans court. There the court quoted approvingly from the 
investigator's affidavit when it used the terms "I concluded," "it appears," and "created a 
potential for anticompetitive conduct." Id. at 183. If a trained antitrust investigator finds 
evidence suggesting anticompetitive conduct, the investigation should be permitted to 
proceed "to aid the State in determining whether an enforcement action should even be 
initiated." Id. 
Moreover, Brixen is incorrect in asserting there was no factual specificity. While 
the affidavit does not identify - by name - the persons whom the investigator had 
interviewed, it does specify that he has spoken with employees of a manufacturer, 
employees of hardware distributors, school district officials, architects, and DFCM 
representatives. The affidavit describes specific types of documents he reviewed. (R. 31-
32). 
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Notwithstanding that the affidavit did not disclose the names of persons 
interviewed, some of these details were disclosed at the trial court hearing. As is 
discussed in the State's initial appeal brief, Judge Lewis required the State to identify 
many of the persons who had provided information to it. Br. Aplt. at 17-22. While 
Brixen well may want to know from whom the State has obtained information, these 
confidential details are not necessary for a trial court to conclude that the State has 
adequate information. The test does not require "specific facts," only "objective 
evidence." Evans 963 P.2d at 183. That objective evidence can be satisfied with a 
description of the investigator's findings, without requiring disclosure of the identity of 
persons interviewed. 
POINT II 
WHEN CHALLENGING A LEGAL RULING, THE STATE IS NOT 
REQUIRED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Brixen asserts the State "must marshal all evidence supporting the finding and then 
demonstrate . . . [why it is] clearly erroneous." Br. Aple. at 12 (citing a case involving 
termination of parental rights). Accordingly, Brixen complains the State failed to meet its 
burden in this appeal. 
At issue in this case is a legal ruling, not a factual finding. "[A] trial court 
determination of whether a specific set of facts give rise to reasonable suspicion is a 
determination of law . . . ." State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995). The 
Evans Court described this review standard as it applies to antitrust investigations: 
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"Therefore, we will review the district court's decision for correctness while affording a 
'measure of discretion' to that court in our application of the correctness standard to a 
given set of facts." Evans, 963 P.2d at 179. 
Brixen admits as much. Its brief cites the same language from Evans in describing 
the standard of review. Br. Aple. at 1. It is unclear why Brixen also argues that the State 
must marshal evidence in this case or why Brixen believes the trial court determination is 
a "factual finding." 
POINT III 
IT IS REASONABLE FOR THE STATE TO BELIEVE BRIXEN HAS 
RELEVANT INFORMATION. 
Brixen argues the CID issued to it was "properly dismissed because the State failed 
to show that Brixen & Christopher violated the antitrust laws or possessed information 
relevant to the State's investigation." Br. Aple. at 13.6 Once again, Brixen urges 
adoption of the wrong standard. 
As discussed in the State's initial appeal brief, the State does not have to show that 
Brixen violated the law or even that the State suspected that Brixen was violating the law. 
If there is reasonable cause to believe that someone is violating the law, the State can seek 
relevant information from others. Br. Aplt. at 15 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
6
 In fact, Brixen goes further and adopts the position apparently taken by Judge 
Lewis below. Brixen argues: "The State must show that the information it seeks is 
relevant to Brixen & Christopher's suspected violation." Br. Aple. at 13. 
11 
917(7)(b)(ii); § 76-10-917(1) (1999)). 
The proper question is whether it is reasonable for the State to believe Brixen has 
information relevant to the State's investigation of artificial bidding restraints. Evidence 
was presented to the trial court showing the State's grounds for believing Brixen would 
have relevant information: Brixen performs architectural work for state construction 
projects for DFCM (R. 40; 84:24-25). DFCM prohibits architects from using consultants 
affiliated with vendors and from using any consultants without prior permission from 
DFCM (R. 58, 84:23-24). The only outside door-hardware specification writers in Utah 
are affiliated with manufacturers or distributors (R. 34: 84:13, 19-20, 24, 30-31). The 
Attorney General had information regarding specific instances of submission of 
specifications which favored the products of certain manufacturers (R. 23-24, 31, 35-39; 
84:7, 19, 30, 32). In many cases, the owners of these public buildings did not request, or 
even know of, bid restrictions (R. 23, 33, 35, 84:7, 25). One of the largest door hardware 
manufacturers employs two specification writers whose sole task is to write specifications 
for architects - for free (R. 34). 
Based on these facts, it is reasonable for the State to believe Brixen would have 
information showing the extent to which manufacturers or distributors have written 
specifications on bids prepared by Brixen for public buildings. Even if Brixen has not 
used outside specification writers, that answer is relevant information that will aid the 
Attorney General in determining the scope of the influence on public building bidding by 
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manufacturers's specification writers. Of course, if Brixen has taken advantage of the 
free specification writing services, it is relevant to know the projects on which this has 
occurred and the extent to which the resulting bid specifications favored products of that 
manufacturer. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to apply the proper standard in evaluating the State's 
reasonable cause. The evidence should be considered as a whole, and assumed to be 
accurate, as the court determines 1) whether it is reasonable for the State to believe 
anyone is violating the antitrust laws and 2) whether it is reasonable to believe Brixen 
possesses relevant information. 
Applying this standard, the trial court erred in determining the evidence presented 
to it - and available to it via the State's investigator - failed to constitute "reasonable 
cause." The trial court's order of dismissal should be reversed and an order entered 
enforcing the CID issued to Brixen. 
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JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
WAYNE KLEIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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